Introduction
Through their annual movements in search of favorable locations to feed, breed, and raise their young, migratory birds connect ecosystems and countries that are sometimes thousands of kilometers apart. In the course of these journeys, populations of migratory birds encounter a myriad of threats, including habitat loss and degradation; unsustainable taking; human disturbance; mortality caused by physical barriers such as wind turbines and power lines; non-native species; poisoning; marine pollution; incidental take (in particular, the bycatch of seabirds in long-line and trawl fisheries); depletion of food resources (especially through overfishing); and diseases.
1 They also traverse multiple jurisdictions, the laws, policies, and conservation priorities of which may differ considerably. Although a spectacular natural phenomenon, bird migration thus presents challenges from a conservation perspective, and international cooperation is needed to maintain populations of migratory birds at or to restore them to a favorable conservation status. Because weak protection in even one segment of a population's migration route ("flyway") 2 has the potential to counteract conservation efforts in other parts of its range, international frameworks for coordinating the conservation and management of migratory waterbirds should ideally encompass entire flyways. However, the majority of the international legal instruments that aim to achieve bird conservation have failed to take this approach.
3
In the Americas, eastern Asia, and Australasia, for instance, bird conservation is pursued primarily through bilateral treaties and non-binding flyway initiatives.
4 While several multilateral bird conservation treaties have been concluded between European countries, 5 and the Directive on the Conservation of Wild Birds (Birds Directive) applies to all European Union (EU) Member States, 6 these instruments have omitted large portions of flyways that extend beyond Europe into Africa and Asia. In contrast, the Agreement on the Conservation of African-Eurasian Migratory Waterbirds (AEWA) seeks to coordinate the conservation and management of waterbirds across their entire flyways in Africa and western Eurasia.
7 Adopted as an Agreement under the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals (the CMS or Bonn Convention), 8 AEWA was the first multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) to be explicitly dedicated to flyway conservation and remains the world's largest legally binding flyway instrument.
9 In theory, the Agreement thus provides an important tool for the conservation of African-Eurasian waterbirds, 10 as well as a possible model for conservation efforts in respect of other regions and taxa.
11 Despite this potential, the Agreement has thus far attracted relatively little attention from legal researchers.
LEWIS
The date of 16 June 2015 marked the 20-year anniversary of AEWA's adoption, and the Agreement has been in force for over one and a half decades.
13 Against the backdrop of AEWA's birthday celebrations, this article reflects on both the past and future of the Agreement, and its role in relation to other MEAs. The article aims to identify the strengths that distinguish AEWA from other prominent global and regional conservation treaties and to examine the Agreement's progress to date and the challenges that need to be addressed if its implementation is to be improved in the future. Part 2 provides a brief background for this discussion by outlining the limitations of using other conservation treaties as tools for conserving and managing migratory waterbirds. Parts 3, 4, and 5 then examine AEWA's scope and substantive provisions, the manner in which the Agreement has evolved since its entry into force, and the mechanisms used to guide, monitor, and facilitate parties' implementation efforts. Throughout this discussion, factors are highlighted that distinguish AEWA from other relevant MEAs, as are examples of the synergies that AEWA has established with other instruments. Finally, Part 6 analyzes the challenges facing the Agreement, before conclusions are presented in Part 7.
International treaties relevant to the protection of African-Eurasian migratory waterbirds
A myriad of environmental treaties-some global in scope, others regional or even bilateral-currently contribute to the conservation of African-Eurasian migratory waterbirds. These include instruments focusing on the conservation of wildlife, natural resources, or biodiversity in general;
14 on the protection of particular groups of species to which some or all migratory waterbirds 15 or the species on which they depend belong;
16 or on the conservation and/or management of specific ecosystems or areas that provide waterbird habitat.
17 Also relevant are instruments that contribute to waterbird conservation in a more indirect manner by addressing broad environmental threats, such as hazardous chemicals, marine pollution, and climate  AEWA entered into force on  November . UNEP/AEWA Secretariat, A Brief History of AEWA, http://www.unepaewa.org/en/page/brief-history-aewa.  
change.
18 A comprehensive analysis of such treaties' contribution to waterbird conservation falls outside the scope of this article.
19 It is, however, worth briefly considering the limitations of the most prominent conservation treaties that operate within the same geographic area as AEWA, so as to provide a backdrop against which to consider the role and strengths of the agreement.
The "big five" global conservation treaties-the Ramsar Convention 24 -all play a role in protecting waterbirds and/or waterbird habitat, and they have sufficiently broad geographic coverage to encompass entire flyways. However, the first four of these instruments are limited by either the threats they address or in the species or areas in which they require conservation action. Further, with the exception of CITES, all these conventions are characterized by broadly worded provisions, some of which are also heavily qualified.
25 For instance, the Ramsar Convention, despite its explicit emphasis on waterfowl, applies only to wetland habitat (upon which not all waterbirds rely for their entire annual cycles), has limited application to species-level threats (such as unsustainable harvest), and is made up of vaguely drafted provisions, most of which are qualified by such terms as "should, " "as far as possible, " and "endeavour. "
26 In comparison, regional conservation treaties tend to address a broad variety of both habitat-and species-level threats and contain more detailed and legally rigorous provisions.
27 This is understandable, given that it is easier to reach consensus among a limited number of states (especially where there is little sociocultural and economic divergence within this group) than at the global level. There is, however, regional variation in both the level of protection these instruments provide for migratory birds and the institutional mechanisms and resources available for monitoring and supporting their implementation. For instance, the Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats defines the vast majority of European birds as either protected or strictly  See, e.g protected, 28 contains special provisions regarding migratory species, 29 and has a fairly advanced system for monitoring and reviewing implementation. 30 In contrast, the 1968 African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources prescribes special protections for relatively few avian species, 31 places no emphasis on migratory species specifically, and fails to establish an institutional framework for monitoring and reviewing implementation, with the result of being described as a "sleeping treaty. "
32 More stringent conservation requirements and an improved institutional structure are provided by a 2003 revised version of the African Convention. 33 However, this version has yet to enter into force, 34 and its implementation is likely to be problematic, given the socioeconomic challenges faced by African states.
35
Another feature that often limits regional treaties' contributions to the conservation of migratory waterbirds is their geographic scope. For instance, only African states may become parties to the African Convention, 36 with the result that the Convention does not cover the entire flyways of inter-African migrants. The same problem faces bilateral migratory bird treaties, such as those to which both Canada and the Russian Federation are parties.
37 In recognition of the fact that the ranges of some species extend beyond Europe and that conservation problems may thus call for cooperation with non-European states, 38 membership of the Bern Convention is open to states that are not members of the Council of Europe.
39 It is thus possible for this Convention to be used as a framework for coordinating conservation efforts along the entire flyways of even long-distance migrants. The Convention also arguably obliges its parties to assist in conservation initiatives occurring outside Europe for the benefit of European migratory species.
40 Its applicability to migratory species that are not native to Europe (such as intra-African migrants) is, however, questionable. explicitly restrict its application to European species, its title indicates that the Convention was introduced with the objective of conserving European wildlife, 41 and its Standing Committee has recommended that species that are non-native to Europe be excluded from the Convention's list of strictly protected fauna.
42 That said, the Standing Committee has also occasionally adopted recommendations regarding the conservation of species with no connection to Europe (such as the lion, Panthera leo). 43 The Convention thus arguably has the potential to play a role in the conservation of non-European migratory species.
44 Unfortunately, however, this potential is limited by the fact that the Convention has thus far attracted little interest from countries outside Europe, only four of which are currently contracting parties. One of AEWA's most important features is that it is designed to coordinate the conservation and management of waterbirds ("birds that are ecologically dependent on wetlands for at least part of their annual cycle") 46 across their entire migration routes.
47 Unlike many other regional conservation treaties, AEWA's geographic range is thus defined on the basis of ecological, rather than political, boundaries, and the Agreement provides a framework for true flyway-scale conservation. AEWA currently applies to 254 species (listed in Annex 2 to the Agreement), and its geographic range encompasses the whole of Africa and Europe, parts of Asia, and the Canadian archipelago (this "Agreement Area" is defined in Annex 1). Seventy-four of AEWA's 119 range states are currently parties to the Agreement, as is the European Union (EU).
48
Of course, it is not unusual for instruments in the CMS Family to cover species' entire ranges.
49 However, the vast majority of the CMS's bird-related instruments are non-binding. These include, inter alia, 54 Initially, it was envisaged that binding agreements similar to AEWA would be adopted for both Asia-Australasia and the Americas.
55 However, these instruments have never materialized.
56 At present, the only other bird-related treaty to have been adopted under the CMS framework is the Agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels (ACAP), 57 which is much less ambitious than AEWA in terms of species coverage, applying to only 31 species of pelagic seabirds.
58 Although none of these is also an AEWA species, AEWA does apply to several species of coastal seabirds.
59
There is consequently some overlap in the threats addressed by the two agreements, which also have partial geographic overlap. 
Fundamental principles
Article II of AEWA, titled "Fundamental Principles, " provides that " [p] arties shall take co-ordinated measures to maintain migratory waterbird species in a favourable conservation status 61 or restore them to such a status. " This mandatory provision sets a standard at which species must be maintained (the implication being that AEWA does not only apply to species which already have an unfavorable conservation status), 62 or to which depleted species must be restored, and appears to require that parties take all measures necessary to achieve this result.
63 A series of more detailed requirements is, however, enumerated in Article III, which describes a collection of "General Conservation Measures" for the protection of Annex 2 species, as well as Annex 3, which includes a legally binding Action Plan. the detail and legal rigor of AEWA's requirements and the Agreement's ability to evolve over time have been facilitated by this tiered arrangement of conservation commitments.
In implementing the requisite measures, parties "should take into account the precautionary principle. "
64 The wording originally proposed for this provision was more strictly formulated ("Parties shall apply the precautionary principle") 65 than that which was finally adopted, but it was watered down during the text's development.
66 While it may be considered unfortunate that this provision is not expressed in stronger language, 67 it is, nevertheless, significant that AEWA's reference to precaution appears in the Agreement's operative text, as a fundamental principle to inform the Agreement's implementation, rather than merely a preambular paragraph or resolution (as is common amongst the global biodiversity-related MEAs 68 ). 
Article III's general conservation measures
Although AEWA's application is not restricted to species with an unfavorable conservation status, Article III requires parties, when taking conservation measures, to pay particular attention to such species. 70 In order to align AEWA's requirements with those of the CMS, Article III requires that parties to AEWA provide the "same strict protection for endangered migratory waterbird species in the Agreement Area" as the CMS requires 71 in respect of the endangered migratory species listed in Appendix I to the Convention.
72 Such alignment is especially important given that parties to AEWA need not also be parties to the Agreement's parent Convention.
73 This provision has, however, resulted in complexities in interpreting permissible exemptions to the AEWA Action Plan's taking prohibitions, since the Action Plan's exemptions are not modeled on those of the CMS (which prohibits  AEWA, supra note , at art. II( the taking of Appendix I species) but rather on those of the Bern Convention and EU Birds Directive.
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The remaining conservation measures prescribed by Article III address sustainable use; the identification, protection, management, rehabilitation, and restoration of important habitat; the maintenance or re-establishment of suitable networks of habitat; the investigation and remediation of problems caused by human activities; cooperation in respect of emergency situations; the management of nonnative waterbird species; research; training; awareness-raising; and information exchange.
75 Most of these requirements, though broadly worded, are expressed in obligatory, unqualified language 76 and are thus legally stronger than many of the provisions that appear in the major global biodiversity-related treaties.
77 As discussed below, 78 the requirements are further strengthened by parties' inability to enter general reservations in respect of the Agreement text. and lists only species and families of waterbirds. 89 AEWA's approach has the advantage of allowing conservation requirements to be tailored to the needs of individual populations, even where these differ from the measures needed to achieve conservation at the species level. For instance, the bean goose, Anser fabalis, is globally categorized as a species of "Least Concern. "
90 However, this categorization fails to reflect that there are two subspecies of bean goose occurring in the AEWA Agreement Area, one of which (the tundra bean goose, Anser fabalis rossicus) is far more abundant than the other (the taiga bean goose, Anser fabalis fabalis). 91 The tundra bean goose is listed in Column C, Category 1 of AEWA's Table 1, which attracts the lowest level of protection provided by the Action Plan.
92 For instance, the Action Plan does not require that parties regulate the taking of birds from this population (although a broad sustainable use requirement does apply). In contrast, the west and central Siberia/Turkmenistan to western China population of taiga bean goose is listed in Column A, Category 1(c), with the result that parties must, inter alia, prohibit the taking of birds from this population.
93 Yet another approach is required for the northeast Europe/northwest Europe population of taiga bean goose, which is listed in Column A, Category 3(c) and marked with an asterisk, with the result that its hunting must be regulated and may occur only within the framework of an international species action plan.
94 The Bern Convention, on the other hand, includes the entire bean goose species on Appendix III, thus requiring that contracting parties regulate, but not prohibit, exploitation.
95 This comparison illustrates, first, the nuanced approach of AEWA's listing system and accompanying obligations, which, although complex, are arguably more advanced than the species-and family-based lists of other instruments. Second, it shows that one of the implications of AEWA's population approach is that the Agreement's requirements in respect of specific populations do not always align with the requirements of other treaties, with AEWA's protections being stronger than those of other instruments for some populations, and weaker for others. 
.. Detail and stringency of the Action Plan's provisions
The AEWA Action Plan itself is divided into sections on species conservation, habitat conservation, management of human activities, research and monitoring, education and information, and implementation. Its provisions are extremely detailed when compared to instruments with a broader geographic and/or thematic focus, and thus provide for targeted interventions to address the threats faced by migratory waterbirds. This can, for instance, be seen in the Action Plan's various levels of protections regarding hunting, several of which are described above with reference to the bean goose. Another example is the Action Plan's provisions on nonnative species. Provisions on controlling the introduction of alien species (either generally 97 or within certain environments) 98 are found in a wide range of treaties, some of which additionally urge the control or eradication of species which have already been introduced.
99 It is thus unsurprising that AEWA's Action Plan contains general requirements regarding the introduction, accidental escape, and control of non-native species that may be detrimental to waterbirds.
100 However, the Action Plan additionally includes provisions that explicitly link the control of non-native species to the rehabilitation of degraded ecosystems, outline measures for eliminating/mitigating the threat posed by non-native predators to breeding migratory waterbirds on islands and islets, and address the issue of non-native species introduced through aquaculture.
101 While it is common to find this level of detail in the non-binding resolutions adopted by treaties' governing bodies, 102 the approach is unusual for a legally binding text. On the other hand, several of the Action Plan's provisions are (perhaps unsurprisingly given their detailed nature) expressed in weak or qualified language.
103 The Action Plan's provisions thus vary in stringency. The most legally rigorous provisions are concentrated primarily in the sections on "Species Conservation" and "Management of Human Activities, " which include unqualified requirements regarding, inter alia, taking restrictions 104 (the emphasis on this issue being understandable, given that AEWA's negotiation was initially motivated by concerns over unsustainable waterbird harvest).
105 In contrast, the majority of the provisions appearing in the Action Plan's section on "Habitat Conservation" are qualified by the term "endeavour. "
106  E.g., CBD, supra note , at art. (h); Bern Convention, supra note , at art. ()(b).  E.g., UN Watercourses Convention, supra note , at art. ; UNCLOS, supra note , at art. ().  E.g., CMS, supra note , at art. III()(c); CBD, supra note , at art. (h).  AEWA, supra note , at Annex , para. ..  Id. at Annex , paras. ., .., ...  See, e.g., CBD Invasive Alien Species, http://www.cbd.int/invasive/cop-decisions.shtml (last visited  October ) (listing numerous decisions of the CBD's Conference of the Parties (CoP) concerning alien invasive species).  See generally AEWA, supra note , at Annex . For instance, although the Action Plan's general provisions on the introduction of non-native species are expressed in obligatory language, most of its more detailed provisions on these species are qualified by such phrases as "to the extent feasible and appropriate, " "shall endeavor, " and "parties are 
.. Overlap with other treaties
AEWA is designed to address the full range of threats facing migratory waterbirds. Overlap thus inevitably exists between parties' various commitments under the Agreement and their commitments under the myriad of other environmental treaties that operate within the AEWA Agreement Area. Overlap between treaties' provisions can, of course, be problematic where provisions intended to regulate the same issue conflict with one another or result in the duplication of efforts under separate treaty regimes. It is therefore significant that several of the AEWA Action Plan's provisions are clearly designed to support those of other instruments, rather than to introduce additional international requirements. For example, parties to AEWA must endeavor to "give special protection to those wetlands which meet internationally accepted criteria of international importance" 107 (this being an obvious reference to the criteria developed for designating sites under the Ramsar Convention 108 ) and to make "wise and sustainable use" of all wetlands in their territory 109 (also a core requirement under the Ramsar Convention).
110 Parties must also endeavor to "ensure, where practicable, that adequate statutory controls are in place, relating to the use of agricultural chemicals, pest control procedures and the disposal of waste water, which are in accordance with international norms" (as are provided by, for instance, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants)
111 "for the purpose of minimising their adverse impacts on the populations listed in Table 1. " 112 Further, parties must "establish and effectively enforce adequate statutory pollution controls in accordance with international norms and legal agreements, particularly as related to oil spills, discharge and dumping of solid wastes, for the purpose of minimising their impacts on the populations listed in Table 1" 113 (the "legal agreements" referred to here would include a wide range of global and regional treaties aimed at addressing marine pollution).
114 Finally, the Action Plan urges parties to work through the framework of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs, several of which prescribe management measures for fisheries within the AEWA Agreement Area) 115 minimize the impact of fisheries on migratory waterbirds-especially as regards bycatch in fishing gear and the food depletion from unsustainable fishing.
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These provisions suggest that, although the AEWA Action Plan contains provisions on a wide range of threats to migratory waterbirds, it is not intended that the Agreement will necessarily take the lead in addressing all of them. Especially where broader environmental problems are already the focus of other treaty regimes, it is rather envisaged that AEWA's parties and institutions will cooperate with these in a manner that ensures that migratory waterbirds are afforded adequate consideration, while avoiding duplication of efforts. There is also, of course, a need to coordinate AEWA's activities with those of the global and regional conservation treaties with which the Agreement overlaps. AEWA's Agreement text highlights the need for such coordination, directing the AEWA Secretariat to consult with the secretariats of relevant international instruments, as well as other organizations competent in the field of conservation.
117 The Agreement text places particular emphasis on consultation with the bodies responsible for the secretariat functions of the CMS, Ramsar Convention, CITES, 1968 African Convention, Bern Convention, and CBD, with a view to AEWA's Meeting of the Parties (MoP) "cooperating with the Parties to these conventions on all matters of common interest and, in particular, in the development and implementation of the Action Plan. "
118 On the basis of, inter alia, AEWA's strong emphasis on cooperation, Adam has argued that the Agreement provides a paradigm for harmonization and joint implementation amongst the biodiversityrelated MEAs.
119 However, the existing literature fails to consider the extent to which AEWA has actually established cooperative arrangements with other instruments. This issue is explored throughout the discussion below.
International single species Action Plans and management plans
While AEWA's focus on one group of shared species has enabled parties to agree on remarkably detailed legal obligations, the fact that a large number of waterbird species are covered (254 in total, with differing migration strategies, ranges, and conservation requirements) inevitably dilutes the Action Plan's ability to address the specific needs of individual species or populations. with a view to developing and implementing such plans for waterbird populations listed in Column A, Category 1 (these being populations with the least favorable conservation status and thus in need of recovery), as well as populations that are listed in Column A, Category 2 or 3 and marked with an asterisk (since the hunting of these populations is permitted, despite their unfavorable conservation status). In addition, paragraph 2.1.1 specifies that the hunting of both asterisk-marked populations and populations listed in Column A, Category 4 (these being Near Threatened species) may occur only within the framework of an ISSAP. In contrast to ISSAPs, ISMPs are intended to manage waterbird populations that cause damage to economic interests, and in respect of which there is thus a need to reduce the damage in question while maintaining the conservation status of the species/populations concerned.
122 Paragraph 4.3.4 requires parties to cooperate with a view to developing such plans "for populations which cause significant damage, in particular to crops and fisheries. "
Thus far, the AEWA MoP has adopted 24 ISSAPs and one ISMP. 123 In 2015, the MoP further adopted AEWA's first international multi-species action plan (for the Benguela upwelling system coastal seabirds).
124 A question, however, arises concerning the legal status of these plans. It is clear that ISSAPs, even once approved by the MoP, are not intended to be directly binding. Indeed, these plans do not only identify activities for governments, but for a range of additional stakeholders in respect of which AEWA creates no direct obligations. However, paragraph 2.2.1 of the AEWA Action Plan does require parties to "cooperate with a view to" the implementation of such plans. Should a party to which an ISSAP applies make no efforts towards implementing such plan, the party will thus be in breach of its AEWA commitments, as will a party that permits hunting to occur outside the framework of an action plan, in contravention of paragraph 2.1.1. Curiously, paragraph 4.3.4 does not call on parties to implement, but only to develop, ISMPs. It is unclear whether this omission was intentional or simply an oversight by the provision's drafters. In  Initially, the text of paragraph .. also described these types of plans as "single species action plans. " However, at its fifth session, the MoP decided that the term "single species management plans" should be introduced so as to avoid confusion between those plans designed for the recovery of species with a poor conservation status and those designed for the management of healthy populations that cause significant damage to crops, fisheries etc. the case of the latter, the provision should ideally be amended so as to explicitly require that parties cooperate with a view to implementing management plans. In any event, it should not be forgotten that parties to AEWA are under a broad obligation to "take co-ordinated measures to maintain migratory waterbird species in a favourable conservation status or to restore them to such status. " 125 Given that both ISSAPs and ISMPs identify measures necessary to maintain or restore the conservation status of specific species/populations, such plans arguably provide benchmarks against which to assess whether parties are meeting this commitment in respect of particular species.
A range of fora other than AEWA support the development of species action and management plans as tools to conserve and manage birds. For instance, the European Commission regularly provides funding for the development of such plans for the EU;
126 both single species and multi-species action plans have been developed under the Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), a working group of the Arctic Council;
127 the Barcelona Convention 128 and its protocols, specifically, the Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity in the Mediterranean, require that parties formulate and implement action plans for the conservation or recovery of certain species;
129 and various single species action plans have been called for and/or endorsed by the Bern Convention's Standing Committee 130 and the CMS CoP. 131 Therefore, species action and management planning are not unique to AEWA. Nevertheless, the Agreement provides a particularly valuable framework for the development of such plans because, unlike some other instruments and initiatives, it is designed to operate at the flyway level. By coordinating AEWA's planning efforts with those of other fora, plans that cover only part of a species' range (for instance, the area falling within the EU) can thus be expanded to cover entire migration routes. Of course, the fact that the Agreement covers such a large number of populations means that there are populations whose ranges extend beyond AEWA's clearly defined Agreement Area. In such instances, collaboration between AEWA and the CMS can allow for the development of flyway-scale plans. Indeed, efforts have been made to coordinate AEWA's species action planning process with similar processes under other instruments. management plan for the black-tailed godwit, Limosa limosa, 132 was upgraded to the flyway level through an AEWA ISSAP, which was partially based on the EU plan.
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There have also been instances in which AEWA, the European Commission, and the CMS have jointly initiated and provided financial support for the development of common action plans.
134 An advantage of these plans being adopted under AEWA is that parties to the Agreement are obliged to cooperate with a view to implementation. Such a requirement is absent from the text of both the EU Birds Directive and the CMS.
A final point regarding the relationship between AEWA's action and management planning processes and other international instruments is that the Bern Convention's Standing Committee (which has long encouraged inter-treaty collaboration in the promotion, review, and implementation of action plans)
135 has endorsed most of the AEWA ISSAPs that target European species and has recommended that contracting parties take note of AEWA's first ISMP.
136 Under the latter, rigorous population modeling has been used to determine international hunting quotas for the Svalbard population of the pink-footed goose, Anser brachyrhynchus. European countries have attempted to achieve adaptive harvest management 138 at the flyway level. It thus provides a test case for the feasibility of this approach for other species.
4. The evolution of AEWA's coverage and requirements 4.1 AEWA's flexibility to evolve over time Human understanding of environmental problems and appropriate response measures is continuously changing, as are the nature and extent of environmental problems themselves. It is thus necessary for environmental treaties to include mechanisms that enable them to evolve over time.
139 Most contemporary MEAs include a provision that specifies that amendments to the treaty text may be adopted by a qualified majority of the parties present and voting; that amendments, once adopted, will enter into force after the deposit of a set number of instruments of acceptance; and that, once they have entered into force, amendments will bind only those parties that have deposited such instruments.
140 Such amendment processes are cumbersome and lengthy, and they are thus generally inappropriate for regular use or for achieving rapid responses to emerging threats. However, it is possible for flexibility to be achieved through other means. AEWA's flexibility is one of the most impressive features of the Agreement and distinguishes it from many MEAs outside the CMS Family. This flexibility is facilitated by AEWA's use of annexes, which form an integral part of the Agreement, 141 defining its geographic scope (Annex 1), defining its species coverage (Annex 2), and specifying actions that parties are required to take in relation to priority species and issues (Annex 3). Amendments to AEWA's annexes are adopted by a two-thirds majority of the parties present and voting, and they enter into force for all parties 90 days after adoption, except for parties that have entered a reservation with respect to the amendment.
142 This procedure is significantly less onerous than the procedure for amending the Agreement text itself.
143
Thus far, the AEWA MoP has made several amendments to Annexes 2 and 3. The significance of these amendments and the reservations entered by parties in respect thereof are discussed below. By amending Annex 1, the MoP could redefine the Agreement Area to encompass additional multi-species flyways, thereby expanding AEWA's geographic influence. Indeed, range states of the CAF Action 
.  E.g., Ramsar Convention, supra note , at art.  bis; CMS, supra note , at art. X; CITES, supra note , at art. XVII; CBD, supra note , at art. ; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. ,  May ,  UNTS .  AEWA, supra note , at art. I().  Id. at art. X() (this procedure also applies to the adoption of any additional annexes).  See id. at art. X().
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144 have expressed their desire for the Plan to be incorporated into AEWA.
145
However, no formal proposal to this effect has yet been presented to the AEWA MoP.
Evolving taxonomic coverage
As explained above, AEWA applies only to the species of waterbirds listed in Annex 2 to the Agreement, and the provisions of the AEWA Action Plan apply only to populations listed in Table 1 of Annex 3. When AEWA was first adopted, Annex 2 included 170 species, only 59 of which were initially covered by Table 1 (these being mostly Anatidae). 146 In recognition of the fact that most of the conservation measures required by the Action Plan are relevant to a broad range of species, the first session of the AEWA MoP (MoP1) expanded the Action Plan's application by amending Table 1 to cover all species listed in Annex 2.
147 Revised versions of Table 1, which keep the Table aligned with Annex 2 and update the conservation statuses of listed populations, have been adopted at subsequent MoPs.
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At MoP2, 65 species were added to Annex 2, 149 with the intention being for AEWA to cover all species of migratory waterbirds occurring within the Agreement Area, regardless of their conservation status.
150 This approach, while similar to that of the Bern Convention, differs from the approach taken by the CMS and CITES, which (while using lists of species that are amended at each CoP) only provide direct protections for species that are endangered or at risk of becoming endangered.
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While AEWA's definition of "waterbirds" is based on the Ramsar Convention's definition of "waterfowl, "
152 the AEWA MoP's interpretation of which species qualify as waterbirds has thus far been more conservative than that of the Ramsar CoP, which includes even wetland-related raptors and owls. always applied to several species traditionally considered to be seabirds, 154 and, at MoP4, Annex 2 was amended to include an additional 20 seabird species.
155 There has also been some discussion about whether to develop the Agreement to cover additional taxonomic groups that rely on wetlands, such as birds of prey and passerines.
156 Indeed, it has even been suggested that AEWA's scope might, in the future, be expanded so that the Agreement encompasses all CMS MoUs and Action Plans relating to African-Eurasian birds, thus becoming a framework birds Agreement for this region. 
Evolving conservation commitments
It is fairly common for MEAs to stipulate a less cumbersome procedure for amending annexes than for amending their core provisions.
158 However, in the case of wildlife treaties outside the CMS Family, annexes tend to be used primarily to list species in respect of which parties are required to take conservation measures.
159
AEWA and several of the Bonn Convention's other ancillary agreements are thus distinctive insofar as their annexes also include an elaborate collection of conservation commitments.
160
That AEWA's Action Plan was designed to be a living document, which evolves over time, is clear from Article IV(2), which requires that the Action Plan be reviewed at each MoP. Since AEWA's entry into force, the MoP has added detail to several Action Plan provisions so as to provide parties with more concrete guidance regarding the content of their obligations. ) .  E.g., CITES, supra note , at arts. XV−XVII; CMS, supra note , at arts. X−XI; Bern Convention, supra note , at arts. −.  See CITES, supra note , at apps. I−III; CMS, supra note , at app. I; Bern Convention, at supra note , at Annexes I−III (Annex IV is more substantive, listing prohibited means and methods of exploitation).  Legally binding Action Plans, or "Conservation Plans, "are also annexed to ACAP, supra note , at Annex ; ACCOBAMS, supra note , at Annex ; Agreement on the Conservation of Gorillas and Their Habitats,  October ,  UNTS I-. A Conservation and Management Plan is additionally attached to the Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic, North East Atlantic, Irish and North Seas, at Annex,  March ,  UNTS . However, unlike the plans annexed to other CMS Agreements, this plan is subject to the same amendment procedure as the Agreement text. Id. at art. ()().  At MoP, paragraph ..(b) (which requires parties to regulate modes of taking in respect of column B populations) was amended to include a (non-exhaustive) list of indiscriminate or otherwise problematic modes of take which parties must prohibit; paragraph ..(b) (which allows parties to grant exemptions to various prohibitions for reasons of "overriding public interest") was amended to define the meaning of "overriding public interest" in this context; and paragraph . (on habitat rehabilitation and restoration) was amended to include a list of causes of habitat degradation, which may necessitate rehabilitation/restoration. AEWA, Res. ., supra note , at app. I; Proposals to the th Session of the Meeting of the Parties, supra note , at −, .
amended or introduced to address threats faced by groups of species that previously had not been covered by AEWA, 162 as well as new/emerging threats to waterbirds in the Agreement Area.
163 Interestingly, the MoP has also shown a willingness to remove discretionary language from the Action Plan and to add text that strengthens parties' obligations. Thus far, this has been done in respect of provisions on the introduction of non-native species, 164 the regulation of problematic modes of take, 165 and the hunting of Column A populations. 166 The significance of this is that, although several of the Action Plan's provisions are phrased in qualified wording, the Action Plan has the potential to evolve into a stronger legal document. The same cannot be said of the detailed, yet non-binding, recommendations and resolutions adopted by the decision-making bodies of MEAs with qualified provisions.
Of course, while the Action Plan has the potential to develop into a stronger legal instrument, the opposite is also true, as it is possible for the MoP to weaken the Action Plan's provisions or to delete them altogether.
167 Thus far, amendments that might be considered to have weakened parties' obligations have included the removal of a specified timeframe within which parties are to endeavor to phase out  Following the addition, at MoP, of new species to Table , paragraphs .., .., and .. of the Action Plan required amendment (to address the potential for conflicts between human activities and the various fish-eating birds now covered by AEWA), as did paragraph .. (to address the needs of the colonially nesting birds now covered by the Agreement). When additional species of seabirds were added to Annex  and Table  the use of lead shot for hunting in wetlands 168 and the removal of the requirement that hunting of asterisk-marked Column A populations occur only where such hunting is a "long-established cultural practice. "
169 However, both of these amendments were well justified, 170 and neither appears to have far-reaching practical implications, since the lead shot provision has, in any event, always been qualified by the word "endeavour, " the "long-established cultural practice" terminology was broad enough to cover a wide range of hunting activities, and only three Column A populations are currently marked with an asterisk. 
Reservations
Of perhaps greater concern than the MoP's ability to weaken the Action Plan is the ability of individual parties to enter reservations at the time of ratification in respect of "any species covered by the Agreement or any specified provision of the Action Plan. "
172 Reservations may further be entered in respect of amendments to the Agreement's annexes.
173 Although it is fairly common for conservation treaties to permit reservations in respect of their annexes, 174 allowing reservations obviously has the potential to frustrate the achievement of an instrument's objectives. Thus far, parties to AEWA have used their ability to enter reservations somewhat sparingly. While Finland and Iceland have declared that the hunting restrictions required by the Action Plan will not apply to certain species, 175 these reservations have not gone so far as to completely exclude species from the Agreement's application. Thus, while the countries in question may not be required to implement the specific taking restrictions prescribed by the Action Plan, they remain under a broad obligation (per Article III.2(b) of the Agreement text) to ensure that use is sustainable. Denmark, the EU, Finland, and Sweden have also entered reservations against the  Paragraph .. of the Action Plan originally required that parties "endeavour to phase out the use of lead shot for hunting in wetlands by the year . " Once the year  had passed, this deadline became redundant, making it desirable to amend the provision. AEWA, Res. ., supra note , at ; Proposals for Amendment to the Annexes of the Agreement, supra note , at . The amended paragraph .. requires parties to "endeavour to phase out the use of lead shot for hunting in wetlands as soon as possible in accordance with self-imposed and published timetables. " The replacement of a fixed time period with wording that allows parties to set their own deadlines diluted the obligation in this provision. Note, however, that at the same MoP that adopted this amendment, a Strategic Plan was adopted that identifies the phase out of lead shot by all parties as a target to be achieved by . AEWA, AEWA Strategic Plan -, at  (September ), available at http://www.unepaewa.org/en/documents/strategic-plan. This was extended to  through AEWA, Res. .: Extension and Revision of the AEWA Strategic Plan and the AEWA Plan of Action for Africa (- November ), available at http://www.unepaewa.org/sites/default/files/document/aewa_mop_res_ext_rev_sp_poaa_en_.pdf.  Originally, paragraph .. of the Action Plan required parties to prohibit the taking of birds and eggs of Column A populations but provided an exception for asterisk-marked populations in Categories  and , which could be hunted on a sustainable use basis where such hunting was a "long-established cultural practice. " At MoP, the term "longestablished cultural practice"was deleted from paragraph .. because it was considered to be too vague for practical application. The amendment thus broadened the hunting activities that are permissible under this provision. AEWA, Res. ., supra note , at app. I; Proposals to the th Session of the Meeting of the Parties, supra note , at −.  See supra discussion in notes -.  AEWA, supra note , at Annex , tbl. .  Id. at art. XV.  Id. at art. X().  See, e.g., CMS, supra note , at arts. XI(), XIV(); CITES, supra note , at arts. XV(), XVI(), XXIII().  up-listing of certain populations from Column B of Table 1 to Column A. 176 Again, this does not mean that these populations are not covered by AEWA, but rather that the stricter obligations attached to a Column A listing will not apply to the parties that have entered reservations.
Several parties have entered reservations in respect of the Action Plan's provision on the phasing out of lead shot for hunting in wetlands.
177 However, all but one of these reservations are for a limited period or in respect of a limited area.
178 In addition, parties remain under a broad obligation to "maintain migratory waterbird species in a favourable conservation status or to restore them to such a status" 179 and, to this end, to ensure that the use of both waterbirds and their habitats is sustainable. For countries in which the use of lead shot is having a significant impact on waterbird populations, AEWA thus arguably requires that measures be taken to address this impact, regardless of whether a reservation is in place in respect of paragraph 4.1.4 of the Action Plan. This example illustrates just how important it is that AEWA, while permitting reservations in respect of the Action Plan, does not allow general reservations in respect of the Agreement text.
180 Of course, the reservation process does allow the requirements of AEWA's Agreement text to be avoided in respect of specific species. However, no party has yet used reservations in this manner.
One advantage of allowing reservations in respect of the Action Plan is that this provides flexibility for parties whose domestic laws require an internal approval process for new international obligations that takes longer than the 90 days after which Action Plan amendments enter into force. Indeed, it is for this reason that the Czech Republic has entered reservations in respect of amendments.
181 The reservation process can also be used to quell the concerns of prospective parties about specific commitments that are not feasible to implement within their jurisdictions. One of the most significant gaps in AEWA's membership is currently the Russian Federation, which provides breeding grounds for numerous waterbird species.
182 At a 2013 high-profile meeting to discuss Russia's potential accession to the Agreement, it was noted that AEWA's process for reservations allows for "the concerns raised about the possible negative consequences of the accession of the Russian Federation to AEWA" to be taken into consideration in the accession process, 183 and a list of possible reservations was developed. 
Mechanisms to guide, monitor, and facilitate implementation

Overview of AEWA's institutional framework
Although a treaty's success is obviously influenced by its substantive provisions, concrete legal obligations alone are likely to be ineffective if not supported by a satisfactory institutional framework. Having examined the nature and flexibility of AEWA's substantive provisions, the Agreement's institutions and the progress that these have made in terms of guiding, monitoring, and facilitating implementation must thus be considered. AEWA's Agreement text provides for a MoP (sessions of which are convened triennially), Secretariat, and Technical Committee, 185 and a Standing Committee was established by resolution in 2002.
186 While this institutional structure is similar to that of most contemporary MEAs, the Agreement is more inclusive of NGOs than many other treaties insofar as it formally includes representatives of three NGOs as members of its Technical Committee.
187 Insofar as prioritized ISSAPs and ISMPs are concerned, implementation is coordinated and monitored by International Species Working Groups (ISWGs), the establishment of which is overseen by the AEWA Secretariat.
188 However, such groups can be established only where organizations or governments are willing to coordinate, or at least fund, their activities.
189 The most advanced group thus far established is the ISWG for the lesser white-fronted goose, Anser erythropus, the coordinator of which is based in the AEWA Secretariat and funded by the Norwegian Environment Agency.
190 For species in respect of which ISWGs are not considered necessary, less formal species expert groups have been developed, based on existing cooperation networks. 
Guiding implementation
While it is possible for the AEWA MoP to clarify the content of parties' obligations through additions to the Action Plan, more detailed guidance documents take the form of non-binding resolutions and "Conservation Guidelines. " 192 The resolutions adopted by the first two MoPs focused primarily on administrative and institutional issues, with the only substantive conservation issue addressed via resolution at these meetings being the use of lead shot for hunting in wetlands 193 (a longstanding concern of European countries, though not a pressing issue for all parts of the Agreement Area).
194 The resolutions adopted at subsequent MoPs have focused increasingly on substantive issues and have also had a less Eurocentric focus, with the issues addressed including climate change, avian influenza, power lines, agrochemicals, extractive industries, non-native species, renewable energy, sustainable use, and threats in the marine environment.
195 In addition, 15 conservation guidelines, covering a broad range of issues, have thus far been adopted to assist parties to implement AEWA.
196 Despite being a relatively young instrument, AEWA has thus facilitated the development of a substantial body of guidance on the conservation and management of waterbirds and their habitat. Some of this guidance has been praised for taking a more progressive approach than other instruments. For instance, Trouwborst has concluded that "AEWA currently represents 'best practice' among the twenty-six CMS daughter instruments in respect of the adaptation of species to climate change. "
197
Potential, of course, exists for overlap between AEWA's guidance materials and the guidance developed under other MEAs or international organizations. Indeed, several parties have raised the "considerable overlap" in guidance as a justification for failure to make use of AEWA's Conservation Guidelines.
198 Overlap is obviously problematic if guidelines on the same topic conflict with one another or where efforts have been duplicated and scarce resources thus arguably wasted. The AEWA Action Plan recognizes the importance of "ensur [ing] , where possible, coherence with guidelines approved under other international instruments, " but it is silent on avoiding duplications.
199 Nevertheless, a perusal of AEWA's Conservation Guidelines reveals that these generally attempt not to duplicate but rather to complement and build on existing guidance documents (to which readers are frequently referred in the AEWA guidelines) by providing detail on how to address particular issues from a waterbird conservation perspective specifically.
200 A similar approach is seen in MoP resolutions, which refer to relevant resolutions of other MEAs 201 and, in some instances, urge parties to apply guidance adopted under such MEAs rather than providing additional guidance.
202 Recently, efforts have also been made to develop common guidance to serve the purposes of several MEAs.
203 Where feasible, it would certainly seem desirable to pursue this route, thereby avoiding a profusion of guidance documents on similar issues, while additionally ensuring that the needs of waterbirds are taken into consideration in guidance endorsed by other MEAs.
A final point regarding AEWA's guidance documents is that the MoP has adopted a Strategic Plan, which is intended to guide the Agreement's implementation for the period [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] [2014] [2015] [2016] [2017] [2018] 204 and, to this end, identifies a series of objectives and targets, as well as quantifiable indicators for measuring progress towards each target's achievement. The linkage of these targets and indicators to a specified timeframe is important, given that neither AEWA's Agreement text nor its Action Plan prescribes deadlines by which the Agreement's objectives are to be met.
Monitoring implementation
.. National reports
Like other MEAs, AEWA relies heavily on self-reporting as a means of gathering the information necessary to review national implementation. 205 The nonsubmission of national reports has been a challenge for the Agreement, 206 as has the late submission of reports 207 and the submission of incomplete reports.
208 In 2008, a new Online Reporting System (ORS) was introduced, 209 which it is hoped will reduce parties' reporting burden over time by allowing the retrieval of responses for future reporting cycles and potentially facilitating the sharing of questions across treaties.
210 While AEWA subsequently experienced an increase in overall submission rates for MoP5, submissions decreased during the MoP6 reporting cycle, in which only 55 percent of the reports due were received, 211 severely constraining the MoP's ability to assess AEWA's implementation and effectiveness.
.. International reviews
AEWA's implementation is also monitored via a series of international reviews that the Agreement's Secretariat is required to prepare in coordination with the Technical Committee and parties. The Action Plan prescribes a list of issues that must be covered by international reviews as well as the intervals at which each review must be updated. Format, at  (- October ), available at http://www.unep-aewa.org/sites/default/files/document/ res__online_reporting_.pdf.  Although AEWA was the first MEA to use the ORS and was closely involved in this tool's development, the system has subsequently been customized for use by several other treaties (see UNEP, Sourcebook of opportunities for enhancing cooperation among the biodiversity-related conventions at national and regional levels  (), available at http://www.unep.org/ecosystemmanagement/Portals//Documents/cooperation-sourcebook-biodiversityconventions.pdf).  AEWA (prepared by UNEP/WCMC), Analysis of AEWA National Reports for the Triennium -, at , UNEP/AEWA/MOP. (Sept. , ), available at http://www.unep-aewa.org/sites/default/files/document/ mop__analysis_nr_-.pdf.  AEWA, supra note , at Annex , paras. ., .. Initially, paragraph . called for all reviews to be updated at intervals of no more than three years. However, MoP adjusted the requisite frequency of updates to a less onerous and more costeffective level. AEWA, Res. ., supra note ; Proposals for Amendment to the Annexes of the Agreement, supra note . The only review that needs to be updated for every MoP is thus the review of the status and trends of waterbird populations.
the prescribed issues: 213 the networks of sites used by AEWA populations (although a draft review has been prepared on this issue, 214 funding constraints have delayed its finalization) 215 and gaps in information from surveys. Rather than being limited to parties' responses in their national reports, the sources of information for AEWA's international reviews are varied, and they include, inter alia, stakeholder responses to questionnaires, scientific and popular literature, and national legislation. The fact that the reviews are not based purely on self-reporting (which may be incomplete or inaccurate) makes them a valuable basis for assessing progress towards the Agreement's implementation. They also provide a basis for identifying gaps in the AEWA Action Plan and can result in amendments thereto. 
Facilitating implementation
AEWA's monitoring mechanisms have thus far revealed significant shortfalls in the Agreement's implementation at the national level. For instance, responses in parties' national reports 217 indicate that, although progress has been made towards some of the Strategic Plan's targets (for instance, the establishment of national monitoring systems to assess waterbird status), 218 others still required considerable work (including, inter alia, the provision of legal protection for Column A species, the implementation of ISSAPs, and the control/eradication of non-native species).
219 Similarly, AEWA's various international reviews have identified gaps in the Agreement's implementation, with several reviews highlighting that implementation appears to be more advanced in Europe-particularly in the EU, where the Birds Directive applies-than in other parts of the Agreement Area.
220 Lack of resources and expertise are frequently raised by parties as justifications for failing to implement their commitments, 221 although other factors (such as national insecurity and a lack of recognition of the importance of waterbirds and wetlands) 222 also impede implementation in some countries. In light of these challenges, this section briefly discusses the various mechanisms that have been developed under AEWA to facilitate its improved implementation. 
.. Prioritizing implementation tasks and supporting implementation in Africa
Given the broad range of species and issues covered by AEWA and the fact that many of the Agreement's parties have limited capacity to implement its requirements, the prioritization of activities is obviously desirable. Since its first session, the AEWA MoP has maintained a list of "international implementation tasks" (IITs) to assist parties in prioritizing their implementation measures and to guide prospective donors in their allocation of funds. 223 The AEWA Secretariat seeks to facilitate listed activities and, to this end, engages in fundraising and coordinates closely with related conventions and organizations. The best example of such coordination to date has been the Wings Over Wetlands (WOW) project: a large-scale Global Environmental Facility project that contributed to the implementation of both AEWA and the Ramsar Convention.
224
Since 2008, particular emphasis has been placed on enhancing AEWA's implementation in Africa. MoP4 initiated an "African Initiative for the Conservation of Migratory Waterbirds and their Habitats in Africa, "
225 under which a Plan of Action for the Implementation of AEWA in Africa 226 has been developed. This Plan of Action was developed to identify and prioritize actions necessary for implementing AEWA's Strategic Plan in this region. Progress has been made in implementing the Plan of Action for Africa.
227 For instance, the AEWA Small Grants Fund (which, although established in 1999, 228 became operational only in 2010 due to a lack of funding) has supported several small-scale projects in Africa.
229 However, the Plan is extremely ambitious, identifying 83 activities in total, with an estimated implementation cost exceeding nine and a half million euros.
230 Indeed, it could be argued that, as a first step towards enhancing implementation in Africa, the Plan is too detailed and lacks sufficient prioritization. This appears to have been recognized to some extent, as further prioritization of the Plan's activities has already been attempted through a series of subregional meetings.
231
.. Implementation Review Process
The establishment of multilateral procedures to examine cases of apparent noncompliance and to facilitate and, in some instances, enforce improved compliance has become increasingly popular amongst MEAs.
232 AEWA's Agreement text makes no provision for the development of such procedures. However, in 2008, the MoP established an Implementation Review Process (IRP), in terms of which the Agreement's Standing Committee may, upon receiving information concerning human activities with adverse effects/potential adverse effects on migratory waterbirds or the habitat thereof, notify the party in whose territory these activities occur, request a response from this party, and offer to arrange an on-site assessment as a basis for recommendations.
233 Information on possible IRP cases may be submitted by, inter alia, NGOs 234 -this being an important feature of the process, given that parties to MEAs are often reluctant to initiate compliance proceedings in respect of themselves or against other parties. Indeed, none of the complaints thus far submitted as possible AEWA IRP cases have been received from parties.
235
Although it is too early to assess the effectiveness of the IRP in promoting compliance with AEWA, this process was the first of its kind to be established within the CMS Family 236 and thus potentially provides a model for the development of similar mechanisms by other agreements and the CMS itself.
237 The process is similar to the Ramsar Convention's Advisory Missions, which are intended to assist parties with the management of Ramsar sites whose ecological character is threatened by human activities, 238 and the Bern Convention's case-file system, through which complaints regarding possible breaches of the Convention are considered and onthe-spot appraisals arranged where necessary. 239 However, AEWA IRP cases are not restricted to habitat-related threats (unlike Ramsar Advisory Missions) and can be used in more countries than the Bern Convention's case-file system as a result of AEWA's wider geographic coverage. Indeed, the first IRP case to be opened demonstrated the unique role of the AEWA IRP, by addressing a species-level issue (the illegal hunting of the critically endangered sociable lapwing, Vanellus gregarius) in a country that is not covered by the Bern Convention-Syria.
240
The other three IRP cases that have thus far been opened all relate to issues 241 that can be addressed by the compliance processes of-and that have, to some extent, already drawn attention from-the Bern and Ramsar Conventions. While AEWA's IRP should arguably place a stronger focus on issues for which this is not the case,
242
an overlap with the processes of other treaties is not in itself problematic. Indeed, the initiation of compliance procedures under more than one treaty has the benefit of exerting increased pressure on a country that is in serious breach of its international commitments; furthermore, duplication of efforts can be avoided through cooperation between relevant instruments. Even before AEWA's IRP was created, the Agreement's Secretariat established a collaborative relationship with other treaties in respect of on-site assessments, participating in joint missions under both the Ramsar and Bern Conventions.
243 Such collaboration has continued following the IRP's establishment. For instance, a joint AEWA and Bern Convention mission to Iceland is tentatively planned for 2016 to address lowland afforestation plans that threaten the breeding grounds of several AEWA species.
244
A possible criticism of AEWA's IRP is that this process is voluntary in the sense that a party in respect of which an IRP case has been opened has the discretion whether to (i) agree to an IRP mission (indeed, Bulgaria has already declined such a mission), and (ii) implement the recommendations arising from such mission. The IRP is, in other words, entirely facilitative and cannot be used as a tool for coercing compliance. A question that consequently arises is whether this procedure could (and, if so, should) be developed to provide for punitive noncompliance response measures. Given the detailed and obligatory nature of many of AEWA's provisions, there is arguably greater potential for developing rigorous compliance procedures under the Agreement than there is for developing such procedures under instruments that are drafted in broadly worded, qualified language, such as the Ramsar Convention, the CBD, and (to a lesser extent) the CMS.
245 One type of coercive response measure that might, for instance, be well suited to the AEWA system is the suspension of certain rights and privileges (such as the right to sit on the Agreement's Standing Committee or to apply to the AEWA Small Grants Fund) in cases of persistent noncompliance.
246 The AEWA MoP could also consider adopting declarations of noncompliance, such as those used by the Bern Convention's Standing Committee.
247
Of course, before developing the IRP into a more coercive tool, the AEWA MoP should consider whether this might have any negative impacts on the Agreement's operation. One possible problem with coercive measures is that they may impact the willingness of range states to accede to the Agreement. This is something that should be avoided, given the current gaps in AEWA's membership.
248 Another possible drawback of coercive measures is that, in the face of potential penalties for noncompliance, parties may be more hesitant to add to or strengthen the conservation measures required by the AEWA Action Plan-or, alternatively, more likely to enter reservations in respect thereof.
.. Other mechanisms
In addition to having established its own procedure for implementation review, AEWA is involved in a number of multi-stakeholder initiatives that aim to establish implementation mechanisms dedicated to addressing specific threats. Notably, the Agreement's Secretariat has spearheaded the development of a Plan of Action and International Task Force to address bird trapping along the Mediterranean coasts of Egypt and Libya.
249 It is further envisaged that AEWA will cooperate with several  Indeed, Koester has commented that compliance mechanisms "would hardly serve any reasonable purpose as far as Ramsar and the CBD are concerned because of the very general nature of their obligations, which, additionally, are largely qualified. 
251
It is interesting that AEWA took the lead on the Plan of Action for Egypt and Libya, as the trapping practices at issue do not present a significant threat to waterbirds specifically-these not being target species.
252 On the one hand, AEWA's role in the initiative suggests that the Agreement holds a particularly prominent position within the broader CMS Family and perhaps has the potential to become a leader on all bird-related issues. On the other, AEWA's limited resources should arguably be dedicated to addressing issues of more direct relevance to waterbirds.
Challenges to improved implementation
Despite AEWA's detailed and stringent provisions, flexibility to evolve over time, and active supporting institutions, 36 percent of the 376 AEWA populations for which trend data is available are currently declining, 39 percent are stable or fluctuating, and only 25 percent are increasing.
253 The Agreement, therefore, has not yet been effective in ensuring that all populations of African-Eurasian migratory waterbirds are maintained at, or restored to, a favorable conservation status. While a variety of factors hinder parties' abilities to implement the Agreement at the national level, the Agreement itself also faces various challenges (several of which are common hurdles to MEA effectiveness) that must be addressed if AEWA's contribution to the conservation and management of migratory waterbirds is to be enhanced in the future.
Gaps in data
The effective conservation and management of migratory waterbirds depends heavily on the existence of reliable data. AEWA therefore requires parties to engage in research and monitoring, 254 and both the Agreement's international reviews remain in the identification of internationally important sites for AEWA populations, 258 and little is known about some of the threats facing migratory waterbirds.
259
A lack of scientific information concerning AEWA populations and their habitats limits the ability both to develop adequate policy responses 260 and to accurately gauge AEWA's effectiveness. Insofar as policy responses are concerned, the Agreement's implementation should, per Article II(2), be informed by the precautionary principle.
261 Lack of scientific knowledge therefore should not prevent parties from taking prudent measures to prevent damage. For instance, where information does not exist regarding a population's status or trend, the most prudent response may be to list it on one of the higher Table 1 categorizations so as to protect it from activities that may negatively impact its conservation status.
Gaps in membership
While the number of AEWA parties is gradually increasing-especially in Africa, where the African Initiative promotes accession 262 -45 range states still are not parties to the Agreement, with gaps in membership being concentrated predominantly in Central and Southern Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.
263 This is obviously problematic, since true flyway-level conservation requires participation by all range states. Interestingly, there are ways in which AEWA provides a platform for cooperation between parties and non-parties, and even assists non-parties in their conservation efforts. Most notably, ISSAPs and ISMPs are designed in consultation with stakeholders from all relevant range states, regardless of whether they are parties to the Agreement, 264 and non-party range states are encouraged to participate in AEWA's ISWGs 265 and may be assisted by ISWG coordinators in the national implementation of ISSAPs and ISMPs.
266 That said, there is clearly no legal obligation for non-parties to cooperate in the development and implementation of such plans or to comply with any of AEWA's other provisions (including provisions on the national reports necessary for monitoring implementation).
267 Implementation support should also arguably be concentrated on countries that have firmly committed to implementing AEWA and that contribute to the Agreement's budget. There thus remains a need to fill the gaps in AEWA's membership.
Resource constraints and the need for improved prioritization of activities
AEWA faces challenges in respect of both human and financial resources. Regarding the former, the Agreement's Secretariat is small when considered against the volume of work that it is expected to perform, and Technical Committee members contribute their time on a pro bono basis and have limited capacity to address the numerous tasks requested by the MoP.
268 As regards financial resources, the various international measures required for AEWA's implementation (for instance, the production of ISSAPs and ISMPs, Conservation Guidelines and international reviews, and the provision of assistance to parties through the Agreement's Small Grants Fund and IRP missions) are obviously funding-dependent. Each party is required to contribute to AEWA's budget in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment.
269 However, not all parties diligently comply with this obligation.
270 Further, the budgets approved at each MoP are dedicated primarily to the Agreement's administration rather than its implementation, with the result that implementation activities rely largely on voluntary contributions and external support.
271 To date, the resources available have fallen far short of what is necessary for the Agreement to be fully implemented. As noted above, resource constraints have, for instance, impacted both the operation of the AEWA Small Grants Fund and the production of international reviews. Such constraints have further limited progress in respect of AEWA's IITs. For instance, between 2009 and 2012, the Agreement received approximately 1,440,000 euros in voluntary contributions.
272
In comparison, the amount required for full implementation of the IITs for this period was approximately 11,670,000 euros.
273 As of 2012, no progress had thus been made towards 18 of the 31 IITs identified for 2009-2016. 274 Several of these activities have remained on the list since its creation in 1999, without attracting funding.
275
Given the wide range of issues touched on by AEWA and the resource constraints faced by the Agreement, it is important to prevent its efforts from being spread too thinly. To this end, there is a strong need to identify areas in which AEWA is able to make a unique contribution and to prioritize these issues in the Agreement's future activities. For instance, when determining appropriate AEWA IRP missions, priority should be given to issues that cannot be addressed by the compliance mechanisms of other treaties, and the Agreement should avoid taking the lead on initiatives that are not a priority for waterbirds specifically and can be spearheaded by other instruments in the CMS Family (a prime example being bird trapping in Egypt and Libya). AEWA's list of IITs could benefit from more rigid prioritization-indeed, this was recently recognized by the AEWA MoP, which agreed that future lists of IITs be "more limited in extent" and adopted a shorter list of IITs than it had at previous sessions.
276 Similarly, both the current Strategic Plan and the Plan of Action for Africa are broad in nature and should ideally be developed into more focused documents. An opportunity for this will arise in the 2016-2018 triennium, during which revised versions of both the Strategic Plan and the Plan of Action for Africa will need to be prepared for adoption at MoP7.
Synergies with other instruments
For issues in respect of which there is overlap between AEWA and other MEAs, cooperative relationships need to be established and maintained. Such cooperation avoids inconstancies between regimes and potentially saves resources, while allowing AEWA to influence initiatives to address threats for which the Agreement is not in a position to take a leading role. is in need of more refined implementation arrangements. MoP6 further decided to take a "stepwise approach" (under the control of the AEWA and CMS Standing Committees) to strengthening synergies in common service areas but took note that this is not aimed at a merger of Secretariats and confirmed that the appointment of a Joint Executive Secretary for AEWA and the CMS is not a desired option.
284
As regards cooperation between AEWA and her siblings in the CMS Family, collaboration already occurs between the Agreement and the Raptors MoU and Landbirds Action Plan.
285 Despite overlap in the threats covered by AEWA and ACAP, links have not yet been established between these Agreements.
286 Options for such cooperation have, however, been considered by the AEWA Technical Committee.
287
Cooperation between AEWA and the RFMOs that operate within the Agreement Area (and that the AEWA Action Plan recognizes as the appropriate organizations for addressing the impacts of fisheries on waterbirds) would also be valuable, but it has not yet been established.
288 While the AEWA Secretariat lacks the capacity to send representation to the meetings of all relevant RFMOs, 289 it might be possible to establish links with such organizations through collaboration with ACAP (which already works closely with RFMOs) 290 or through AEWA's NGO partners, such as BirdLife International.
291
Given AEWA's overlap with the Ramsar Convention, one would expect a high degree of collaboration between these two instruments. However, no formal arrangements for their cooperation currently exist other than a post-WOW Memorandum of Cooperation, which is intended to provide a basis for continued collaboration in flyway conservation.
292 A trilateral Joint Work Plan (JWP) that was in place between the AEWA, CMS, and Ramsar Secretariats for the period [2003] [2004] [2005] 293 has never been renewed, though the development of an updated JWP was called for by MoP5.
294
Another global instrument with which it might be advisable for AEWA to explore a cooperative relationship is the World Heritage Convention. While the purpose of this Convention is not the protection of habitat per se but rather the protection of sites of outstanding universal value, these may include sites that constitute the world's most important areas for migratory birds, 295 as well as serial properties along species' migration routes.
296 Indeed, the World Heritage Committee has recognized "the role of the global biological phenomenon of migratory species, including birds" and adopted "the principle that the sites associated with these global phenomena be inscribed on the World Heritage List taking into account that the inscription of these sites have to be based on their sustainability to the continuance of these phenomena, their integrity and relevant criteria. "
297 Interestingly, it was discussions regarding the potential serial nomination of the Great Rift Valley as a World Heritage Site (in which the AEWA Secretariat participated)
298 that ultimately lead to the introduction of AEWA's African Initiative.
299 The Agreement's Secretariat has also collaborated in the Wadden Sea Flyway Initiative, 300 which is a response to the World Heritage Committee's request to Germany and the Netherlands (upon the inscription of the German and Dutch parts of the Wadden Sea onto the World Heritage List) to "strengthen cooperation on management and research activities with States Parties on the African Eurasian Flyways, which play a significant role in conserving on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, ) at Annex  () see also supra discussion in note .  Author's correspondence with AEWA Secretariat. The proposal that was initially presented to MoP was not to establish an "African Initiative"but rather a "Great Rift Valley Initiative. "AEWA, Draft Res. ., supra note . The draft resolution highlighted the outstanding universal value of the Great Rift Valley and instructed the AEWA Secretariat to cooperate with, inter alia, the World Heritage Centre to develop plans for the further protection of this area. During the meeting, it was decided to expand the Initiative's scope so as to encompass the whole of Africa.  Common Wadden Sea Secretariat, Wadden Sea Flyway Initiative (WSFI), http://www.waddenseasecretariat.org/management/projects/wadden-sea-flyway-initiative-wsfi (last visited  November ).
migratory species along these flyways. " 301 However, AEWA has yet to establish any formal ties with the World Heritage Convention itself, and even its participation in the Wadden Sea Flyway Initiative has been constrained by lack of resources.
302
As regards AEWA's cooperation with regional conservation treaties, the Agreement's Secretariat has established a good cooperative relationship with the Bern Convention, including with regard to species action plans, advisory missions, and efforts to combat illegal killing.
303 However, cooperative arrangements have not yet been established between AEWA and Africa's regional and subregional nature conservation treaties.
304 The Plan of Action for Africa highlights the need for cooperation with both the African Union and Africa's various regional economic communities, 305 and it is hoped that progress on this issue will thus be made under the Agreement's African Initiative.
This part of the article has suggested the establishment of several new cooperative relationships, and AEWA's broad issue coverage means that there are opportunities for synergies with various additional MEAs not discussed here (for instance, those addressing chemicals and marine pollution). Although such synergies are desirable insofar as they may ultimately, inter alia, save resources and ensure that AEWA species are considered in initiatives lead by other MEAs, their establishment is itself hindered by resource constraints. This has been highlighted above in respect to cooperation with both RFMOs and the Wadden Sea Flyway Initiative. It thus stands to reason that the Agreement needs to conduct prioritizations in respect to not only the issues for which it takes a leading role but also the areas in which it collaborates. Clear guidance on this should ideally be provided in AEWA's next Strategic Plan.
Conclusions
Although there are numerous international instruments that contribute to the conservation of migratory birds in Africa and western Eurasia, AEWA stands out in various respects. On the one hand, the Agreement's focus on a particular geographic region and group of species has allowed it to avoid various shortcomings of the global biodiversity-related conventions-especially as regards the level of detail and legal rigor of its operative provisions. On the other, the fact that AEWA's geographic scope is defined on the basis of ecological boundaries rather than political boundaries enables the Agreement to provide a framework for the conservation and management of even intercontinental migrants-including those which are non-native to Europe. Also important is the manner in which the Agreement provides for various "tiers" of norms: starting with a central obligation to maintain Annex 2 species at, or restore them to, a favorable conservation status, and then proceeding to several broad, though mostly unqualified, general conservation measures for Annex 2 species; a significantly more detailed, though still legally binding, collection of conservation measures for Table 1 populations; and an obligation to develop still more detailed international action and management plans for specific populations. Although complex, this structure allows AEWA's responses to be tailored to the population level. It also gives the treaty flexibility (as seen by the expansion and strengthening of the AEWA Action Plan), while at the same time ensuring that all parties remain bound by a handful of central conservation commitments in respect of which they are unable to enter reservations. Similarly, the fact that several of the Action Plan's provisions are expressed in weak or qualified language does not detract from parties' more stringently worded obligations under Articles II and III of the Agreement. Although a similar structure is used by other CMS Agreements, none of these is as ambitious as AEWA in terms of scope. Indeed, AEWA's taxonomic coverage has, over a relatively short period, evolved from 170 species belonging to 18 families to 254 species belonging to 27 families, 306 and it is possible that both the Agreement's taxonomic and geographic scope will be further expanded in the future.
To support AEWA's provisions, a substantial body of guidance has been produced under the Agreement, and new tools have been developed to monitor and facilitate implementation. These are especially important for parts of the Agreement Area in which countries lack the resources and capacity necessary for implementation, and in which other regional MEAs fail to provide adequate institutional mechanisms for monitoring and supporting conservation efforts. AEWA's current emphasis on improving implementation in Africa is especially encouraging, given the socioeconomic challenges faced by African countries and the fact that institutional structures for supporting treaty compliance are not as advanced in Africa as they are in Europe. Cooperation with other MEAs is obviously essential in the implementation of AEWA's African Initiative, as well as various other activities under the Agreement. Over the past two decades, AEWA has established a variety of synergies with other instruments, although there do remain areas in which strengthened cooperation or new cooperative relationships are arguably necessary.
Given the nature of AEWA's substantive provisions and the manner in which its provisions, scope, and support structure have evolved since the Agreement's entry into force, it is clear that the Agreement has enormous potential. That said, the AEWA Action Plan is extremely ambitious, many of its provisions are not being adequately implemented, and the trend status of many AEWA-protected populations continues to decline. The Agreement's performance is especially hindered by gaps in membership and inadequate resources to support implementation. Its future success will thus hinge largely on the Agreement's ability to attract a higher level  Compare Final Act of the Negotiation Meeting, supra note , at Annex II, to the current version of AEWA's Annex II (adopted through AEWA, Res. ., supra note ).
of accessions and funding 307 and to direct its resources towards those issues in respect of which it can make the most meaningful contribution in relation to other MEAs. Although daunting, the challenges faced by AEWA should not overshadow the progress that the Agreement has achieved in its relatively short lifespan. In the period since AEWA's first MoP, its membership has increased more than fourfold, and support has been provided for a wide variety of research, education, and conservation activities. Despite its resource constraints, there are also examples of AEWA playing a pioneering role in respect of both substantive conservation issues (such as flyway-scale adaptive harvest management) and institutional matters (such as online reporting and implementation review). By the age of 20, AEWA thus occupies a special place within both the CMS Family and the broader cluster of biodiversity-related MEAs. The Agreement's role in bird conservation may become even more dominant in the future, should AEWA spread its wings even further to encompass additional taxa and flyways.
